THE VIRGINIA
RETIREMENT SYSTEM:
ASSESSING ITS
CHALLENGES AND
CHARTING ITS FUTURE
The funded status of the VRS plans has
improved in recent years, in part because of
strong investment performance.
– Joint Legislative Audit and Review
Commission, December 2017

The VRS is actuarially sound.
– GRS Retirement Consulting report,
July 9, 2018
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ublic pension funds for state employees
should, to paraphrase an old English
proverb, be seen and not heard. Yet, this

decade has seen a rising tide of dire warnings
about state pension funds in the United States.
The Pew Charitable Trusts estimated that
at the end of 2018, state pension funds were
underfunded by an estimated $1.5 trillion and
that the problem is likely to get worse in the
coming years.1

Why? Many state pension funds assume that
they can generate returns far in excess of
the market. Doing so lessens the demands on
state and local budgets today but increases the
unfunded liabilities of the pension funds in the
future. Not only do some funds assume they
can beat the market, they may also understate
their liabilities. When the bill comes due,
states and localities are going to have to make
hard choices. Should they increase taxes,
decrease spending on schools, police and other
functions, or reduce retirement benefits for
state and local government employees, or some
combination of all of the above?
It is natural, therefore, to spend some time
assessing the circumstances and performance
of the Virginia Retirement System
(VRS), which manages the assets in the
Commonwealth’s public employee retirement
systems.
1

 ew Charitable Trusts, “The State Pension Funding Gap: 2017,”
P
(June 27, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/issue-briefs/2019/06/the-state-pension-fundinggap-2017.
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Our work in this chapter is an independent, noncommissioned,

cards historically included inadequate funding by the General Assembly

noncompensated analysis of specific issues relating to the VRS. The

of the state’s public employee pension plans. Consequently, the VRS is

available evidence suggests that the VRS has been well managed and has

“underfunded”; that is, its current asset holdings, prudently invested, are

outperformed many state pension funds. Fortunately for the members of

insufficient to produce the income required to meet anticipated future

the VRS and the taxpayers of Virginia, the VRS has avoided most of the

obligations. On June 30, 2018, the market value of the assets held by

difficulties that have afflicted many other state pension plans.

the VRS was equal to only 78.1% of its actuarially accrued liabilities.4

Our work benefited immensely from face-to-face conversations with VRS

On the plus side, however, the General Assembly has, in recent years, met

officials. We did not always find ourselves in agreement with the views of

its financial obligations to its pension funds. The General Assembly also

the VRS on all issues, but one must credit the VRS for its willingness to

(wisely, in our view) established an independent board to govern the VRS.

engage and to respond to our queries. More public agencies should emulate

There is widespread agreement that the independent board has improved

it in this regard.

the management and performance of the VRS, enabled it to attract and

We suggest four policy changes that would improve the performance of
the VRS, reduce the likelihood that the Commonwealth will confront

retain superior personnel, and increased its reputation among lawmakers,
financial professionals and the public.

serious problems in the future and ultimately benefit its participants.2

The General Assembly determines what kind of public employee

One of these changes would have the VRS rely more on low-cost,

retirement benefits Virginia offers. In recent years, it has exercised

indexed public equity investments instead of paying analysts to actively

its authority to move the Commonwealth away from exclusive reliance

manage the same funds. If the VRS had followed this strategy, we

upon “defined benefit” pension programs (that guarantee participants

estimate it could have earned an additional $3.4 billion on its public

specific future benefits) toward hybrid programs that include both

equity portfolio between 1992 and 2017. There may be additional gains

defined benefit provisions and “defined contribution” provisions. Under

from indexing other segments of the VRS portfolio, but we do not deal

defined contribution programs, the Commonwealth places pension

with those possibilities in this chapter.

contributions into accounts that the participants subsequently own. The
Commonwealth’s financial liability ends there, a circumstance that is not

Some Background
The VRS manages and invests pension funds sent to it by public bodies
in Virginia. On March 31, 2019, the VRS served more than 722,000
members, retirees and beneficiaries and held $80.4 billion in net assets.
VRS payments to recipients included $4.75 billion in retirement benefits
and another $416 million in other postretirement benefits.3 The VRS
ranks as the 15th-largest public pension systems in the United States.
Because the VRS is overseen by the Virginia General Assembly, it often
ends up having to play the financial cards dealt it by legislators. These
2
3
4
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true when employees are in defined benefit programs. In the latter case,
the Commonwealth is obligated to fund previously agreed upon benefits
over what sometimes can be long time periods.
Most new VRS participants, except for hazardous duty employees,
now are automatically enrolled in the hybrid retirement plan. The
federal government and the private sector moved in this direction some
years ago. Now, all but a few private-sector employers provide defined
contribution programs rather than defined benefit programs. While
defined benefit pension programs contain some attractive features for
both the Commonwealth and participants, they have become the source of
significant fiscal stress in numerous states because the financial obligations

A July 9, 2018, audit of the VRS by GRS Retirement Consulting declared the VRS “actuarially sound,” file:///H:/State%20of%20the%20Commonwealth%202018/Pensions/VRS%20Audit%20July%209,%202018.pdf.
Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, VRS Oversight Report (July 2019), http://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/reports/Rpt521-2.pdf.
Virginia Retirement System, Comprehensive Financial Annual Report, 2018.
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of the states to employees carry on long into the future. Defined benefit
plans threaten to bankrupt states, such as Illinois. Hence, moving Virginia
away from defined benefit pension programs is a change essential to the
future fiscal stability of the Commonwealth and its local government units.
While each state has its own distinctive pension fund, there are common
characteristics among these funds. Funds that have encountered financial
difficulties have done so because of one or more of the following decisions:
1. Overly generous pension and attached health care provisions
benefitting public employees,
2. G
 enerous cost-of-living adjustments that exacerbate funding
challenges,
3. G
 rossly inadequate funding of pension obligations by governors and
legislatures,
4. O
 verly optimistic rate of return assumptions for their investable assets
that match neither experience nor the likely future, and
5. E
 xcessive investment of assets in costly actively managed funds that
have performed poorly relative to the overall market.
If there is a lesson here, it is that problems in state pension funds
characteristically are ignored by those in power, build slowly over time
and then emerge as full-blown crises. Timely action now on the part of the
Commonwealth can reduce the risk that the VRS might drift into trouble
in the future. Attempting to address the vulnerabilities of the VRS will be
more difficult when the next economic recession inevitably appears.

Virginia’s Public Employee
Pension Systems
The Commonwealth maintains six different public employee pension
systems: (1) the system that serves most state government employees, who
are or were located in 227 state agencies; (2) the system that serves about
600 special governmental authorities, cities, towns and school divisions;
(3) the state teachers’ retirement system, which is the largest of the six;
(4) the state police officers’ retirement system (SPORS); (5) the Virginia
law officers’ retirement system (VaLORS); and (6) the judicial retirement
system (JRS). The VRS manages all state pension funds, whose individual
members (current or prospective retirees) totaled more than 722,000 in
March 2019.
Graph 1 reports the net asset positions at the end of the 2018 fiscal year
for each of the major pension systems that comprise the VRS. The VRS
invests the money sent to it by jurisdictions that range from towns, cities
and counties to school districts and economic development agencies. The
combined assets of the different systems are invested jointly. However,
the VRS only can invest funds that it receives from local government
bodies. If an employer does not fully fund its contractual obligations to
its current and former employees, then this is a problem that will accrue
to the employer instead of the entire VRS system. According to the VRS,
the average funding level of local government pension systems managed
by the VRS was 92.2% in summer 2018.5 However, funding levels varied –
from the town of Haysi in Dickenson County, having assets valued at only
42.34% of its anticipated obligations; to Loudoun County, at 91.39%; to
Newport News, at 125.69%.6

5
6

Information provided in a communication from the VRS to Old Dominion University’s Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy.
Virginia Retirement System, “Actuarial Valuation of Political Subdivisions,” (June 30, 2017).
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GRAPH 1

GRAPH
1
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■ SPORS

■ JRS

Roughly two-thirds of Americans have left the labor force by age 66, and

Income pensioners receive from the VRS comes from two primary

half leave the labor force between ages 61 to 65. Retirement ages tended

sources: (1) the financial contributions of workers and employers covered

to decline in the United States until the economic reverses of the Great

by the VRS; and (2) the income earned by the VRS from the assets it

Recession and changes in Social Security eligibility altered the calculations

invests. Nationally, investment earnings typically provide about 61% of
promised benefits, but were 67% for the VRS in 2016. Higher investment
income percentages can reflect greater investment success or lower
contribution levels, or both.7

for many individuals. Data from the U.S. Census’ 2018 American
Community Survey tell us that the average retirement age for Virginians
was 65.
The lengthening life span of Americans poses a significant challenge to the
viability of many state pension funds. The expected life span of a newly
born baby was 70.8 years in 1970 but had risen to 78.6 by 2017.8 Simply
put, when pension recipients live longer, a larger asset base is required to

Unfunded Liabilities
At first glance, the financial economics associated with pension funds
are simple. Employers and employees contribute money to a fund that
invests those funds to support payments to the employees, typically when
they retire. To the extent that employers make more generous financial
promises than they can keep to their employees concerning the size and
duration of their retirement stipends, then employers and their employees

take care of them.
Public employee pension funds in most states have UAALs. Graph 2
reveals that as of June 30, 2018, the VRS had a UAAL in excess of $19.7
billion. Stated differently, the market value of the VRS’s assets was
78.1% of its UAAL on that date. The 78.1% funding ratio represented a
significant increase from the low of 60.1% on June 30, 2009, and a 4.7%
increase from June 30, 2017. Now is not the time to declare victory, as a
significant gap remains between assets and liabilities.

either must contribute more money, or higher rates of return must be

Things also could have been much worse. According to the Pew

earned on the funds being invested on behalf of the employees. In Virginia,

Charitable Trusts’ most recent report on state pension funds,9 states

the benefits VRS participants receive are determined by state statute.

reported $4.1 trillion in liabilities and $2.9 trillion in assets in 2017.

When the funds on hand to deal with anticipated future retirement
obligations are insufficient to meet those obligations, then this is called
an unfunded actuarial accrued liability (UAAL) in pension fund parlance.
“Anticipated” is an important modifier in the previous sentence. Among
other things, the moneys that must be paid out by pension funds depend
on the salaries that employees will earn, when employees choose to retire,

On average, states had only 69% of the assets needed to fully fund
their pension obligations. Kentucky’s funding level was only 34%
in 2017, and four other states (Colorado, California, Illinois and
New Jersey) were below 50%. Only eight states had sufficient assets
to cover 90% of their obligations, while 24 states were below 70%
funding.

whether they are eligible by statute to claim disability, and how long they

The VRS has not always been actuarially underfunded. From 2000 to

live. Alas, none of these events can be known with certainty.

2002, it possessed assets that exceeded 100% of its estimated future
actuarial financial obligations. Several developments altered this. First,
the rates of return earned by the VRS fell. The 16-month meltdown

7	National Association of State Retirement Administrators, “Public Pension Plan Investment Return Assumptions” (February 2018), www.nasra.org/files/Issue Briefs/NASRAInvReturnAssumptBrief.pdf, and the Virginia Retirement
System, “VRS Stress Test and Sensitivity Analysis” (June 2017).
8 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018.
9 https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2019/06/the-state-pension-funding-gap-2017.
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in equity prices that began in October 2007 played a significant role.10

Two-thirds of all additional revenues went to fund Medicaid and

Second, the VRS reduced its rate of discount two times during the

pensions between 2008 and 2016. In 2016, city and state governments

succeeding decade (a point we discuss below), and this amplified its

spent about $105 billion on public employee pensions, dramatically up

estimated future obligations. Third, enhanced benefits increased the VRS’s

from about $29 billion in 2001.13

obligations. Fourth, the Commonwealth failed to contribute the VRS
board’s actuarially determined contributions.

Increasing pension liabilities and funding gaps not only command a
greater share of public resources (when states are faced with a pension

This final point is important. From 1993 to 2018, the General

crisis), but also time and attention. Facing significant funding gaps,

Assembly fully funded its own agreed-upon, legally required pension

pension contributions increased 424% in Illinois, 267% in Kentucky and

contributions to statewide retirement systems only six times (2001,

more than 100% in New Jersey from 2007 to 2017.14 Even with these

2005, 2006, 2016, 2017 and 2018). In 2003, the General Assembly

increases, pension funding gaps continued to increase in each of these

made no contribution at all. From 1992 to 2016, the average level of

states.

annual funding compared to the amount required by statute during
this period was 72%.11 The modicum of good news is that the General
Assembly fully funded its contributions in the most recent three years
and is poised to do so again in 2019. Weakening economic growth and,
consequently, state revenues, may place this streak in jeopardy in the

The General Assembly recognized this possibility and related public
employee pension issues when it created the Virginia Commission
on Employee Retirement Security and Pension Reform in 2016. The
commission has issued several recommendations consistent with the

near future.

analysis presented in this chapter. The new commission also recommended

The VRS reports that if the Commonwealth had made the contributions

the results of stress tests that assess the system’s financial viability under

required of it by statute, then the VRS now would have almost 90% of its

a variety of economic scenarios. These reports were released in June

estimated future actuarial financial obligations rather than the current

2017 and December 2018.15 Thus, it is fair to say that neither the General

79%. This is a major reason why the gap between the market value of

Assembly nor the VRS has been ignoring the challenges in front of them.

VRS assets and its actuarial accrued liability expanded (as one can see in

What is needed now is additional action.

12

legislation that would codify existing VRS practice to perform and publish

Graph 2) during and after the Great Recession. The pension fund reforms
begun by the General Assembly in 2010, plus more favorable investment
results, have begun to redress this situation.
Nationally, there is broad agreement that state expenditures on Medicaid
and pensions have crowded out expenditures on other items, such as
education and transportation. The Wall Street Journal reported in 2018
that the proportion of state and local tax revenues devoted to Medicaid
and public-sector pensions was the highest in almost 60 years.

10 The S&P 500 Index fell from 1,516.80 on Oct. 12, 2007, to 735.09 on Feb. 13, 2009.
11 Virginia Retirement System, “VRS Stress Test and Sensitivity Analysis” (June 2017).
12 This statement was included in a communication from the VRS to Old Dominion University’s Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, dated July 6, 2018.
13	Cezary Podkul and Heather Gillers, “Why Are States So Strapped for Cash? There Are Two Big Reasons,” The Wall Street Journal (March 29, 2018), www.wsj.com/articles/why-are-states-so-strapped-for-cash-there-are-two-bigreasons-1522255521.
14 Pew Charitable Trusts, “The State Pension Funding Gap 2017,” June 27, 2019.
15 Virginia Retirement System, “VRS Stress Test and Sensitivity Analysis” (December 2018), https://www.varetire.org/Pdf/Publications/VRS-Stress-Test-and-Sensitivity-Analysis-2018.pdf.
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Evaluating The
Performance Of The VRS

outset, this eliminates a set of conservative investment options. Stability

Public pension funds exist for a variety of reasons, some of which are not

generate 20.0+% rates of return in some years, but -5% rates of return in

strictly economic. Management guru Peter Drucker is one of many who

other years.

have argued that pension contributions by employers instill a sense of
belonging in employees and increase their morale.16 Improved morale may
increase employee productivity, lower turnover and, ultimately, improve
the bottom line.

of the returns earned on invested funds might also be an important
criterion. It may be unacceptable for a pension fund to realize an average
rate of return of 7% over a 10-year period via boom or bust strategies that

VRS management and its board of trustees ultimately choose (perhaps
implicitly) a desired return/risk/cost combination. Presumably, this choice
reflects the VRS’s evaluation of accumulated past economic history as well
as its estimates of future developments. Of course, subsequent economic

It is well beyond the scope of this chapter to examine the morale of

fluctuations may result in the VRS, or any pension fund, experiencing a

participants in the VRS. Instead, in evaluating VRS performance, we will

return/risk/cost combination very different from the one it selected.

focus on three variables: (1) the rates of return earned by the VRS on the
funds entrusted to it; (2) the variability of those rates of return; and (3)
the cost expended in achieving its performance. In a nutshell, we will ask:
What is the average rate of return earned by the VRS, how variable has
been that return and what has been the cost of achieving such?

Retrospectively, however, one can evaluate the results of any investment
strategy and stack it up against known alternatives. Hindsight continues
to be wonderful. On occasion, one might discover that identical results
(say, a 7% certain rate of return) could have been obtained with less
volatility than actually experienced, or perhaps achieved at a lower cost.

One should understand that tradeoffs nearly always exist among the three

This knowledge might inform a different set of choices in the future,

criteria. Usually, it is not possible to increase rates of return on investable

though not necessarily. Consider the significant decline in public equity

funds without also assuming additional risk. The other side of this coin is

prices that occurred from 2007 to 2009, or the run-up in public equity

that it is very difficult to reduce investment risk without also sacrificing

prices that occurred subsequently. These were wrenching, but not

some return. Further, some investment strategies are more expensive to

necessarily unusual events. Making future investment decisions based on

implement than others. Complicating this relationship is that one may

spells such as these could lead to less than optimal decisions if the same

not necessarily buy improved performance by paying skilled investment

circumstances aren’t duplicated in the future.

advisers to provide advice and counsel.

After-the-fact analyses of what the VRS or any investor should have

It is vital to recognize that an infinite number of return/risk/cost

done – had they known what was going to happen – are revealing, but not

combinations exist. No single one of these combinations can be said to

necessarily definitive, or always subjectively fair. Decision makers must act

be absolutely “right” unless one has clearly identified preferences with

when required to do so and face uncertainty when they choose their course

respect to risk and return. For example, is it better to realize an average

of action. On the other hand, if one focuses on choices that might have

rate of return of 9% that is highly variable, or a 7% average rate of return

been made, and these alternatives consistently are superior to the choices

that is quite stable?

made, then this dissonance is worthy of attention.

Some pension fund choices effectively are predetermined. Suppose a public
pension fund must earn at least a certain rate of return, say 7%. From the
16 His views are expressed in “Manage with Courage,” the Drucker Institute (Sept. 28, 2018), www.drucker.institute/news-post/manage-with-courage.
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We argue that the tendency of the VRS to downplay the superior rates
of return and lower costs of many index funds over the past 10 to 25
years is a prime example. The VRS argues that the period 2008-2018
featured unusual economic conditions. Additionally, the VRS points
out that the performance of the indexed public equity funds often
has been more volatile than that of the total VRS portfolio. These
points are legitimate, yet questions remain. Were the costs of actively
managed funds offset by improved returns and increased stability or
did the VRS pay too much for too little return relative to index funds?

The Assumed Rate Of Return
How does the VRS know how well its asset portfolio will perform in the
future and will this be enough for the VRS to meet its obligations? The
answer is, it doesn’t, but neither does any other pension fund. The world
is full of uncertainties. We could witness a stock market crash like the
22.61% single-day decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average in 1987, or
once again experience 17% average mortgage rates as we did in 1981.
The VRS does not know what is going to happen in the future and
therefore must make astute, educated assumptions about how asset
markets are going to behave. Prior to 2010, the VRS assumed it would
average a 7.5% rate of return. Until October 2019, the VRS assumed
its assets portfolio would average a 7% rate of return. However, the
VRS board recently approved lowering a reduction in its assumed
rate of return to 6.75%. This action is conditional on approval of the
General Assembly and the governor in 2020.17
The 7% rate of return assumption may have been too generous. True, since
1900, the average total rate of return (assuming reinvested dividends) on
the equities in the Dow Jones Industrial Average has been approximately
9.4% (about 4.8% in price appreciation and 4.6% from reinvested
dividends). A problem is that this growth has been uneven. The 1965
closing value of the Dow Jones Industrial Average was 969; it was not until
1982 that this value was permanently eclipsed. Between 1929 and 2017, the
Dow Jones Industrial Average declined in 21 of these 88 years.18
The obligations of public pension funds, however, do not diminish or end
because the stock market has tanked. Consequently, pension funds such
as the VRS must diversify their asset holdings so they can have greater
confidence that their assets will generate income even if the stock market
is in agony. Historically, this usually meant using some funds to invest in
U.S. government bonds. Assets such as U.S. government bonds are almost
universally regarded as among the most secure investments in the world.
Risk of default is extremely low.

17 Michael Martz, “Virginia pension contribution rates likely to rise as investment returns decline,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, Oct. 18, 2019.
18 See “Observations,” http://observationsandnotes.blogspot.com/2009/03/average-annual-stock-market-return.html, for Dow Jones Industrial Average rates of return data.
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A problem is that bond yields typically reside well below the rates of

Aubrey Layne noted the need to examine whether the VRS should lower

return on investments in equities. Since 10-year U.S. government bond

its assumed rate of return.21 The adoption of the 6.75% rate of return by

yields peaked at 16.81% in September 1981, they generally have declined

the VRS board in October 2019 was another step in this direction. Given

since, and in late summer 2019, the yield on 10-year U.S. government

that a lower assumed rate of return will require additional contributions

bonds hovered around 1.5%.19 Hence, if one desires safety and security, this

from the Commonwealth’s budget, we now await action by the General

need can be satisfied, but usually one must settle for lower rates of return.

Assembly and Gov. Ralph Northam.

Graph 3 provides annual average yields on 10-year U.S. government
bonds over the past 30 years. The vertical distance between these yields
and the 7% VRS rate of return assumption visually depicts the nature
of the challenging task confronting the VRS. This challenge is only
slightly reduced if the VRS’s assumed rate of return is lowered to 6.75%.
Faced with a long-term decline in yields for U.S. government bonds, the
VRS must find ways to generate more significant returns. It does so by
assuming risk, albeit knowledgeably and after due consideration.
Ultimately, the rates of return earned on investments reflect the sum
of the real rate of return on capital (for which we will use the 10-year
U.S. government bond as a proxy) plus a risk premium on the collections
of assets in which one invests. Larry Summers, the former chair of
the President’s Council of Economic Advisors and former president of
Harvard University, notes that real yields on inflation-adjusted 10-year
U.S. government bonds have declined about 300 basis points over the
past 10 years. He argues that investors (including pension funds) who
believe they can earn 7% on a consistent basis are deluded. He opines
that expected rate of return assumptions made by pension systems should
be substantially lower today than they have been in the past; that is,
lower than 7%.20 The recent declines in U.S. government bond yields only
magnify this conclusion.
In 2019, a growing consensus emerged in Virginia that the VRS’s
assumed rate of return of 7% was a “bridge too far,” echoing, to some
extent, the conclusion of Professor Summers. The VRS’s auditing firm,
GRS Retirement Consulting, and Commonwealth Secretary of Finance
19 “Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates,” www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/pages/textview.aspx?data=yield.
20	Summers made these observations at a National Bureau of Economic Research Conference, “New Developments in Long-Term Asset Management,” held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, May 19-20, 2018. His specific comments can be
found at https://vimeo.com/270659949.
21	Steven Haner, “State Employees Not Funding Their Own Retirement,” Bacon’s Rebellion (July 9, 2018), https://baconsrebellion.com/state-employees-not-funding-own-retirement. Michael Martz, “Virginia Retirement System Hits 7
Percent Investment Target for Year, But Target Could Change,” Richmond Times-Dispatch (July 9, 2018), www.richmond.com/news/virginia/government-politics/virginia-retirement-system-hits-percent-investment-target-for-yearbut/article_e4599466-d4ba-5fe3-830b-e419d3f1c58b.html. Michael Martz, “VRS Raises Investment Return to 7.5 Percent for Last Fiscal Year, Beating Recent Estimate But Still Falling Short of Its Goal,” Richmond Times-Dispatch
(Aug. 29, 2018), www.richmond.com/news/virginia/government-politics/general-assembly/vrs-raises-investment-return-to-percent-for-last-fiscal-year/article_95f05aa9-37a7-5bbb-82c9-7fdc22ef2858.html.
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The Actual Rates Of Return
How well has the VRS performed in terms of the rates of return it has
earned on its assets? The answer depends on whom one asks and how
one asks the question. The VRS provides different data and metrics
over dissimilar time periods than some external authorities, such as the
Pew Charitable Trusts, whose recent studies of state pension funds have
captured much attention. Further, one must be careful to differentiate
between the rates of return earned by the VRS on its public equity
portfolio and those earned on its entire portfolio of assets, which include
investments in other types of assets.

In a July 6, 2018, communication to Old Dominion University’s Dragas
Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, the VRS criticized the Pew
Trust’s choice of a 2006 to 2015 period as “cherry picking” and in faceto-face sessions contended that 15- to 25-year time horizons are more
appropriate. VRS argues “apples and oranges” with respect to Pew’s
data and says Pew defines its rates of return differently than does the
VRS. Regardless, if Larry Summers is on target and the United States
has entered a period when interest rates and rates of return are going to
remain below previously accustomed levels, then the rates of return the
VRS likely can earn will decline.

Graph 4 shows annualized rates of return reported by the VRS on its total
assets over a variety of time periods ending on June 30, 2018. These data
tell us that the VRS often has earned more than the 7% it assumes, but
also that the last decade was a trying one. The VRS Oversight Report
dated December 2017 revealed that the VRS earned an average rate of
return of only 4.9% on its asset portfolio for the 10-year period ending
Sept. 30, 2017.22

22 Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, VRS Oversight Report (December 2017), p. 2, file:///H:/State%20of%20the%20Commonwealth%202018/Pensions/JLARC%20Report%20on%20VRS%20Dec%202017.pdf.

72

■ THE VIRGINIA RETIREMENT SYSTEM: ASSESSING ITS CHALLENGES AND CHARTING ITS FUTURE

GRAPH 4
GRAPH 4

Annualized Rates of Return Earned by the VRS
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The Pew Charitable Trusts, focusing on a different period (2006-2015),

return on its investments (see, for example, the investment section of the

and perhaps utilizing different definitions, placed the VRS firmly in the

VRS 2018 annual report). If 25-year rates of return are the coin of the

middle of a 73-pension fund sample with an average rate of return that

realm, then they should be given greater visibility in the VRS reports.

rose to 5.9%. Pew also provides information that allows us to compare the
performance of the VRS with respect to other public pension funds over
one-year, five-year and 10-year rates of return periods. Graph 5 displays
these data, which include a 6.66% rate of return for the VRS between
2006 and 2015 as compared to a 6.6% average rate of return for 73 publicsector funds.

On Sept. 8, 2019, the VRS announced that it had realized a 6.7% rate of
return for FY 2019. The private equity investment program had an annual
return of 14%, followed by fixed income at 8.3% and real assets at 7.8%.
The public equity program, however, only returned 3.9% and the multiasset public strategies program lagged with a return of 2.2%. The VRS
reported that the trust fund ended with approximately $82.3 billion in
assets.23

The VRS’s rate of return performance improves if one adopts a 25-year
time horizon rather than the 10-year vantage seen in Graph 5. As noted,
many at the VRS believe (and we concur) that the past 10 years have been
atypical and that this helps explain the underwhelming 6.1% rate of return
for the 10-year period ending June 30, 2018.24 VRS professionals believe
that the unprecedented, almost decade-long period of monetary easing
witnessed in the United States after the Great Recession constitutes a
financial aberration. They contend that quantitative easing favored public
equity market performance and do not think that a similar investment
environment is likely to reoccur in the foreseeable future. This is one
reason why VRS personnel prefer to evaluate their performance looking
backward for 25 years rather than adopting a 10- or 15-year perspective.
However, the VRS’s annual reports continue to stress 10-year rates of
23 Virginia Retirement System, “VRS Realizes 6.7% Return for Fiscal Year 2019,” https://www.varetire.org/news/2019/vrs-realizes-6.7-percent-return-for-fiscal-year-2019.asp.
24 Virginia Retirement System, Comprehensive Financial Report, 2018, p. 134.
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GRAPH 5

GRAPH 5

VRS ANNUALIZED RATES OF RETURN: PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS ESTIMATES, 2006-2015

VRS Annualized Rates of Return: Pew Charitable Trusts Estimates, 2006-2015
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How Has The VRS Fared
Compared To The
Overall Market?

in returns by not indexing its public equity investments. We must,

Let’s adopt a 25-year time horizon. Consider the adjusted price per

tradeoff between risk and reward.

share of a specific no-load, low-cost mutual fund that imitates the entire
U.S. public equity market. Vanguard’s Total Stock Market Index Fund
(VTSMX) grew at an annual average rate of 9.29% between June 1992 and
June 2017.25 Vanguard reports that the annual cost of VTSMX was 0.14%,
thus the net cost annual average rate of return was 9.15%. Determining
the net cost return of the stock market index allows a comparison with
VRS’s public equity portfolio.

foregone rate average annual rate of return was 0.59% after taking
into account expenses.27 The VRS may have foregone $3.4 billion
however, note that this estimate varies significantly year to year.
We also must recognize that a stock market index fund may be more
volatile than the VRS would prefer and that there is a recognizable

We provide some risk-adjusted analysis in Table 2. The VRS has
graciously provided us data for a 25-year period, but we must point
out that this period ends in 2017. The more volatile nature of VTSMX
returns mitigates some of the differential, but this sum remains a steep
price to pay for presumed risk aversion because the risk-adjusted rates
of return on VRS public equity and VTSMX are almost identical. Since
approximately one-third of all VRS assets are invested in public equity

Table 1 compares the performance of Vanguard’s Total Stock Market

(and about 80% of this in domestic stocks), the VTSMX (or a similar)

Index Fund with VRS’s Public Equity portfolio from June 1992 to June

index seems an appropriate opportunity cost metric against which the

2017.

26

Over this period, the annual rate of return of VRS’s public equity

portfolio was 8.56%, approximately 0.59% less than Vanguard’s Total
Stock Market Index Fund. One could argue that this is not an equal
comparison since VRS’s public equity portfolio holds non-U.S. equity
assets, thus we caveat that our comparison approximates differences in
rates of return.

VRS should be measured.
Some might view hedge funds as an alternate way for the VRS to generate
enhanced returns. However, indexed public equity funds such as those
offered by Fidelity and Vanguard have outperformed all but a few actively
managed hedge funds, not just over the past decade, but now over the past
15 years, including a half decade when monetary easing was not present.28

Nevertheless, as illustrated in Table 1, Vanguard’s Total Stock Market

Further, this performance differential has held true with respect to many

Index Fund outperformed VRS’s public equity portfolio over every

kinds of hedge funds: small cap, mid cap and large cap. This diminishes

reported time period from 1992 to 2017. Recent data reinforce this

the attractiveness of hedge funds.

observation, as Vanguard’s Index rose 14.7%, compared to 9.7% for
the VRS public equity portfolio from June 2017 to June 2018. These

Some VRS personnel assert that over long periods of time, the cumulative

differences are not trivial.

return on its assets has been higher than a passively invested 70%

From 1992 to 2017, the average holdings of VRS’s public equity

Market Index (which captures global equity investments).29 Table 2

investments were approximately $23.1 billion and we estimate the

explores this contention based on available data.

equities/30% bonds mix, or the S&P 500 or the MSCI ACWI Investable

25 The adjusted price per share is from the last business day of June of the respective years. We calculate the compound annual growth rate to obtain the average annual rate of return.
26 We choose this time period to maintain consistency with the annual performance data provided graciously by the VRS for the Total Fund and Public Equity portfolio.
27	Virginia Retirement System, Comprehensive Financial Reports, Investment Section, Various Years. This is a rough calculation based on the VRS having average public equity holdings of $23.1 billion over the 25-year period. 0.73%
of $23.1 billion is $168.63 million and 25 years * $168.63 million = $4.22 billion.
28	Mark Perry, “More evidence that it’s very hard to ‘beat the market’ over time, 95% of finance professionals can’t do it,” AEI Ideas (March 20, 2018), http://www.aei.org/publication/more-evidence-that-its-very-hard-to-beat-themarket-over-time-95-of-financial-professionals-cant-do-it.
29	The MSCI ACWI Investable Market Index (IMI) says it captures large, mid and small cap representation across developed markets (DM) and emerging markets (EM) countries. With 8,498 constituents, the index is comprehensive,
covering approximately 99% of the global equity investment opportunity set, www.msci.com/documents/10199/4211cc4b-453d-4b0a-a6a7-51d36472a703.
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TABLE 1
ANNUAL RATES OF RETURN:
VANGUARD’S U.S. STOCK MARKET FUND (VTSMX) AND VRS TOTAL FUND AND PUBLIC EQUITY PERFORMANCE, 1992-2017
3 YEARS

5 YEARS

10 YEARS

15 YEARS

20 YEARS

25 YEARS

PERIOD

2014-2017

2012-2017

2007-2017

2002-2017

1997-2017

1992 - 2017

Vanguard VTSMX
Return (Gross)

10.20%

14.46%

7.69%

9.34%

6.98%

9.29%

Vanguard VTSMX
Return (Net of Fees)

10.06%

14.32%

7.54%

9.20%

6.84%

9.15%

VRS Public Equity
Return

6.33%

11.64%

4.54%

7.84%

6.38%

8.56%

Net Difference

3.87%

2.68%

3.0%

1.36%

0.46%

0.59%

Sources: Virginia Retirement System, Comprehensive Financial Report, Various Years, and VRS communication to the Old Dominion University Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy. Annualized returns for periods ending
June 30 of the respective years. Daily share price data for VTSMX obtained from Yahoo Finance. The daily adjusted price per share for the last business day of June is used to calculate the compound annual growth rate (CAGR).
Vanguard reports an expense ratio of 0.14% and this is deducted from the estimated CAGR to obtain a net of fees rate of return.

TABLE 2
COMPARING RATES OF RETURN, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND SHARPE RATIOS
FOR VARIOUS ASSET GROUPS, 1992-2017
ASSET GROUP

MEAN ANNUAL RETURN

STANDARD DEVIATION
OF RETURN

MODIFIED SHARPE RATIO

VALUE OF $100
AFTER 25 YEARS

VRS Total Fund

8.34%

8.84%

0.943

$740.83

VRS Public Equity

8.56%

14.04%

0.610

$779.37

MSCI ACWI IMI Total World

7.19%

11.20%

0.642

$567.36

FUSEX S&P 500

9.07%

15.61%

0.581

$876.26

Passive 70/30

7.65%

10.63%

0.720

$631.46

VTSMX Total U.S. Market

9.29%

15.07%

0.616

$921.53

Sources: VRS data are from the VRS, MSCI and FUSEX, and VTSMX data are from Yahoo Finance. MSCI, FUSEX and VTSMX means and standard deviations are computed on the basis of annual averages rather than annualized
monthly averages. MSCI data have 0.25% annual expenses deducted, while the comparable deductions are 0.09% for FUSEX, 0.10% for 70/30 and 0.14% for VTSMX.
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One can see in Table 2 that the 25-year compound average annual rate

it opted to place significant proportions of its public equity investments

of return on the VRS total fund portfolio trailed that of the other asset

in VTSMX or similar fund vehicles. This strategy also would have

groups described in Table 2; however, the standard deviation of the VRS’s

enabled the VRS to reduce its investment expenses, which totaled more

returns over the 25 years was also substantially less than the other asset

than $457 million in FY 2018.31

groups. This means that the returns on VRS’s total portfolio were less
variable than those earned by the other asset groups.Over the 25-year
(1992-2017) period examined, VRS’s investment strategies resulted in a
substantially higher modified Sharpe Ratio for its total fund than was true
for all other asset groups. Sharpe Ratios measure return obtained per unit
of risk assumed.30 The data in Table 2 reveal retrospectively that the VRS
has done well in terms of generating return per unit of risk in the realm of
public equity. This is long-term evidence that VRS investment policies
have avoided excessively risky investments where public equities are
concerned. At the same time, the VRS has earned respectable rates of
return and maintained liquidity so that it can meet the demands of the
day.

We (along with many economists) believe the VRS should index
substantially larger proportions of its investments. Reports from
former members of the VRS board reveal that the VRS did index
most or all its public equity investments between 1994 and 2001.
Subsequently, a different composition of board members changed the
investment course of the pension fund. All things considered, this was
a costly decision – though perhaps understandable. Low-cost, indexed
investments seldom have strong appeal to those whose livelihoods
depend in whole or part on fee generation.
We understand that investment decisions must be made in an
atmosphere of uncertainty. One doesn’t know what is going to happen
in the future and for this reason we would be surprised if the economic
environment in the next 25 years matches what we observed from

What is a “good” Sharpe Ratio? The answer depends on the time period

1992 to 2017. Knowing this, one should be circumspect in critiquing

chosen because opportunities differ significantly in rising markets, as

the investment decisions made by the VRS over the past 25 years. In

opposed to falling markets. Therefore, one cannot look at the VRS’s 0.943
Sharpe Ratio in Table 2 and make many useful historical comparisons. It
will suffice to say that the VRS’s allocation of its assets performed well

our view, the VRS made thoughtful decisions even though some of its
decision makers may not have been familiar with the full implications
of the empirical evidence presented in this chapter. There is room for
evolution in this regard.

per unit of risk it decided to bear during this time period.

These points acknowledged, the VTSMX fund mimicking the entire U.S.
stock market rather consistently outperformed the VRS in the public
equity area and did so with an almost identical Sharpe Ratio. The major
difference between the two is that the VTSMX generated both higher
rates of return and higher standard deviations (greater volatility) than
did VRS public equity. Using hindsight, we can say the VRS would have
ended up substantially better off at the end of the 25-year period had
30	The Sharpe Ratio for asset “i” is (Ri – Ci)/σi, where R is the rate of return on the asset, C is a certainty rate of return such as a Treasury bill, and σ is the standard deviation of the return. We omit Ci, a constant across asset classes
in a specific time period, from our computations in order to underline the notion of units of return per unit of risk.
31 Virginia Retirement System, Popular Annual Financial Report as of June 30, 2018.
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A Demanding Assignment:
Risk Versus Return
We again note that there does not exist a single “right” combination
of return and risk. Some investors accept copious amounts of risk in
search of higher returns, while others conscientiously shy away from such
scenarios. Conceptually, the VRS is torn between the two. It is currently
expected to earn at least 7% on its investments even while it also is
expected to maintain liquidity and avoid investments that might impair
its ability to meet its long-term obligations and require taxpayer bailouts.
Lowering the assumed rate of return to 6.75% will alleviate some of the
pressure on the VRS, but, as noted earlier, some economists believe that
assumed rates of public pension systems should be substantially lower
than 7%.
Other major state pension funds have reached different conclusions than
the VRS concerning their ability to outperform the market by means of
actively managed funds. The largest public pension fund in the United
States, the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS),
decided to back away from investments in hedge funds because of high fees
and disappointing returns.32 Subsequently, the New York City Employees
Retirement System (NYCERS) voted to end its $1.4 billion investment in

This brings us to a critical, but unavoidable, question. Should we expect
the VRS to outperform public equity market indexes – and to do so with
less volatility than the market – over the next decade? And, at the same
time, should we expect the VRS to maintain reasonable liquidity?
If these are our expectations, then they present the VRS with a very
demanding assignment. Our considered answer to these questions is:
“Probably not.” Why not? Very few asset managers (active or not) exhibit
the consistent ability to earn higher than average rates of return and do
so at lower than average levels of risk. Indeed, portfolio theory suggests
this is impossible unless one is lucky, has inside information or possesses
a stylized trading advantage such as a superfast computer connection that
may provide a millisecond advantage over competitors in the speed of
completing trades.
VRS and JLARC data tell us that the VRS did not earn its target 7%
rate of return between 2008 and 2018, but neither did most other state
pension funds. This stimulated most pension funds nationally to consider
investments in collections of assets that they believe will deliver higher
expected returns. Included in these asset mixes have been land, businesses,
currencies, commodities and options market activities. These portfolios
often carry with them additional expected risk even though they deliver
diversification.35

hedge funds with the comment that “the funds charge enormous fees for

We believe it is unreasonable to expect the VRS on a consistent

high-risk investments yet yield tepid results.”33

basis to outperform some or all other pension funds, hedge funds in

One must assume that CalPERS and the NYCERS have the ability to hire
very talented people to select their investments, yet their hedge funds
underperformed as they have in the rest of the world. Clearly, these two
well-situated pension systems do not appear to share the VRS’s optimism
that they can “beat the market” over the long run in the area of public
equities. Partially in defense of its stance, the VRS informed us that only

general, or the market as measured by indexes such as the S&P 500
or Vanguard’s VTSMX. While it is entirely reasonable to expect the
VRS to “beat the market” in a year or even over several years, the
preponderance of evidence is that it is quite difficult to outperform the
market in the long term. To assume otherwise is to potentially invite
financial peril.

10.8% of its portfolio was devoted to hedge fund investments in July 2018.34
We believe this percentage should be even smaller.

32 Dan Fitzpatrick, “Calpers Pulls Back from Hedge Funds,” The Wall Street Journal (July 23, 2014), www.wsj.com/articles/calpers-pulls-back-from-hedge-funds-1406156915.
33 DC37, ASCME, AFL-CIO, “New York City’s Retirement System Pulls Out of Hedge Funds” (April 14, 2016), https://dc37blog.wordpress.com/2016/04/14/new-york-citys-retirement-system-pulls-out-of-hedge-funds.
34	This statistic was contained in an exchange between the Old Dominion University Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy and the VRS in July 2018.
35 This demonstrates that diversification, per se, does not automatically reduce risk. Assets must have negative co-variances in order for them to reduce risk (as measured by volatility) in a portfolio.
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The Target Rate Of Return
(Rate Of Discount): More
Pension funds must make some assumption about the rate of return they
expect to earn on their invested funds in order to assess their financial
viability. In 2017, the median assumed rate of return for state pension
funds was 7.15%. Yet, from 2006 to 2016, the median rate of return was
only 5.8%. The VRS target rate for this period was 7%, but data from the

The Code of Virginia, Section 51.1-124.30:1, requires the VRS to assess its
sensitivity and vulnerabilities to a variety of possible economic scenarios

Pew Charitable Trusts suggest that the VRS’s actual return was 5.6%.36
During a different 10-year period ending on Sept. 30, 2017, Virginia’s Joint
Legislative Audit and Review Committee (JLARC) said the VRS earned

including reductions in its rates of return, changing benefit levels, and so

only 4.9% on its asset portfolio. And, in yet another 10-year period, this

on. Reports of these test results are submitted to the General Assembly,

one ending March 31, 2018, JLARC reported that the VRS earned a 5.9%

the most recent one dated December 2018. These are complex, though
quite valuable, documents because they pose a series of “What if?”
scenarios involving both good and bad developments. Among these are
negative scenarios that include reductions in the rates of return the VRS
earns on its investments, and reduced contributions from the General

rate of return on its invested assets. Another report, dated July 9, 2018,
stated that the 5.9% rate of return exceeded the VRS’s benchmark return
of 5.5% by 0.4%. Finally, the VRS reported a 6.1% rate of return on its
total fund for the 10-year period ending June 30, 2018.37
A review of the publicly available data strongly suggests that a 7% rate of
return target is overly optimistic. South Dakota, which is considered one

Assembly. Matters such as the long-term savings that could be realized

of the more stable state pension systems, assumes a rate of return of 6.5%.

if more rapid paydown of VRS’s unfunded liabilities were undertaken

The recent decision to lower VRS’s assumed rate of return to 6.75% will,

are also given consideration. The most recent report may be accessed

if approved by the General Assembly and the governor, more closely align

at www.varetire.org/Pdf/Publications/VRS-Stress-Test-and-SensitivityAnalysis-2018.pdf.

VRS’s assumptions with performance. However, it would also increase the
present value of its future obligations.
One can quibble with the categories and measurement criteria the VRS
utilizes to evaluate its performance. The organization usually selects
as benchmarks funds or groups of funds rather than indexes of entire
markets against which to measure its performance.

36 Pew Charitable Trusts, “State Public Pension Funds Increase Use of Complex Investments” (April 2017).
37 Virginia Retirement System, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for the Year Ended June 30, 2018.
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Since a decisive majority of hedge and actively managed funds have not

This could result in a discount rate as low as 4% and, in the case of the

done as well as the overall public equity market in recent years, the

VRS, would substantially increase the present value of its future financial

VRS can “beat the funds,” and beat benchmark performance metrics

obligations. Alicia Mundell, a well-known pension expert at Boston

based upon the funds, even though it may not “beat the market” in the

College, and three of her colleagues modeled the impact of lower discount

form of indexes such as VTSMX. It appears that some of the VRS’s

rates on 126 public pension plans using FY 2010 data. She found that even

benchmarks are not as demanding as they plausibly should be.

a modest decrease in discount rates would have caused the funds’ funding

The VRS must array its future obligations and then discount them to find
what these mean today (that is, find the “present value” of its anticipated
future liabilities). In 2005, the VRS reduced its target rate of return to
7.5%, and then again in 2010 to 7%. Higher target rates of return, when

percentages to fall from 77% of anticipated future financial obligations to
only 63%.39 There is consensus among economists that most public-sector
pension funds understate their future financial obligations because they
discount their future financial liabilities at unrealistically high rates.40

used as a rate of discount, diminish the estimated value of the VRS’s

The recent VRS board decision to adopt a 6.75% assumed rate of return

future financial obligations. When it decreased its target rate of return

will more closely align expectations to performance but also increases the

to 7%, this reflected financial reality (the rate of return the VRS could

present value of the VRS’s future financial obligations. This illustrates the

expect to earn), but simultaneously increased the present value of its

difficult position of VRS management. Unrealistic expectations lower the

future financial obligations.

present value of future financial obligations and commitments from the
Commonwealth’s budget, but also increase the risk that the VRS will fall
short of the funds needed to meet future obligations. More closely aligning

Following the statutory requirement which requires a pay-as-you-go
methodology or contributions on a current disbursement basis, the VRS

expectations with historical performance is a more prudent course of
action and decreases future financial risk. However, lowering the rate of
return has the immediate effect of increasing the present value of future

utilizes a lower rate of discount for its Line of Duty Act obligations, which

obligations, making the VRS appear even more underfunded than it is

relate to eligible survivors of individuals killed or disabled in the line of

now, and requires additional contributions from the Commonwealth’s

duty, or their survivors. In 2017, its liabilities were discounted at a 3.56%

budget.

rate. However, these obligations account for less than 1% of the overall

We applaud the decision of the VRS board to lower the assumed

VRS obligation portfolio.

rate of return to 6.75%. Undoubtedly, this decision will precipitate
a realistic and lengthy discussion about the viability of the
Commonwealth’s pension funds and the nature of the pensions offered
to public-sector employees.

If state pension funds were held to the same accounting standard
as private-sector pension funds, then the Governmental Accounting
Standards Board (GASB) says it would use what is termed a “blended
rate” of discount that combines a risk-free local or U.S. government
bond yield with higher-risk assets such as long-term corporate bonds.38
38	Sheila Weinberg and Eileen Norcross, “GASB 67 and GASB 68: What the New Accounting Standards Mean for Public Pension Reporting,” Mercatus Center, George Mason University (June 15, 2017), www.mercatus.org/publications/
gasb-67-68-public-pension-reporting.
39 Alicia H. Mundell, Jean-Pierre Aubry, Joshua Hurwitz and Laura Quinby, “How Would GASB Proposals Affect State and Local Pension Reporting?” (June 2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2316838.
40 Alicia Mundell et al.
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Asset Mix

elsewhere, and hence some of the world’s prime investment opportunities
exist outside of the United States. Such opportunities titillate investors

In order to moderate swings in the value of its asset portfolio, the VRS
diversifies its holdings across many different asset classes, including
equities, bonds, real estate, commodities and other assets. Like most
informed investors, the VRS subscribes to the old maxim, “Don’t put
all of your eggs in one basket.” In fact, the mathematics and economics
associated with this important advice are complex, and economists
Harry Markowitz and James Tobin won Nobel Prizes for providing and
explaining it. For example, they clarified the principles illustrating how

with the promise of higher returns, but often carry with them higher
levels of risk.
Given these circumstances, and the uncertainties concerning life spans and
the like, what’s a public pension fund portfolio manager to do? He or she
needs to generate that 7% rate of return, but even this may turn out to be
insufficient if the state fails to make the contributions to the pension fund
for which it is obligated.

investors could minimize the risks associated with earning a rate of

Graph 6 reports how the VRS was deploying its $80.4 billion in assets on

return such as 7%.41 Minimizing risk, of course, is not synonymous with

March 31, 2019. Conventional investments in equities (stocks) and fixed-

eliminating risk.

income instruments such as bonds accounted for 56% of the value of the

The salient point to remember is that the higher the average rate of
return one hopes to earn, ordinarily the higher the level of risk one must
assume. The cost of earning a higher than average rate of return may be

VRS’s portfolio. What the VRS terms credit strategies accounted for 14%
of its portfolio, while real assets claimed 14%, private equity, 11%, and
what the VRS labels strategic opportunities, 3%.

increased volatility and likely there would be some years when rates of

The VRS’s asset deployment is not unusual. Most public pension funds

return are negative. For example, in 2000, 2001 and 2002, the annual rates

have responded to their funding and rate of return challenges by investing

of return on the stocks in the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index were -9.03%,

their asset portfolios more aggressively. They seek higher rates of

-11.85% and -21.97%, respectively.

return on their investments, but in order to obtain the promise of such,

42

Such extended declines in value exert great financial pressure on pension
funds, which generate about 60% of their benefit payments from the
dividends and capital gains produced by their investments. The 37.4%
decline in equity values that occurred in 2000-2002 made it very difficult
for any investor to generate capital gains and perhaps constitutes an
argument in favor of asset diversification.
These uncertainties can be compounded by pension funds’ exposure
to fluctuations in foreign exchange rates for investments that may be
denominated in currencies such as yen or euros.43 While the American
economy accounts for about one-quarter of the value of the world’s
economic activity, the most rapidly growing economies are located

ordinarily they must accept higher risks. Nearly all pension funds (the
VRS included) now invest funds in a broad variety of assets. These include
actively managed funds that in turn invest in risky collections of assets
(often with borrowed funds), private equity firms that are not publicly
listed on a stock exchange, real assets such as real estate, and commodities
that could range from pork bellies to aluminum. The VRS, however,
reports that its commodities investments are minimal.
If a pension fund directs more dollars toward alternative assets, then
usually this fund needs to hire more internal talent to conduct this
business and also pay more to outsiders such as hedge fund managers,
who it is believed have the ability to generate higher rates of return. The
March 31, 2018, JLARC assessment of the VRS reported that the VRS

41	Markowitz and Tobin also showed how investors could maximize the rate of return they earned given whatever level of risk they were willing to tolerate. Harry M. Markowitz, “Portfolio Selection,” Journal of Finance, 7 (1952), 77-91.
James Tobin, “Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk,” Review of Economic Studies, 25 (1961), 65-86.
42 Robert Alan Schwartz, “Annual Returns of the SEP 500 From 1928 to 2015,” Seeking Alpha, https://seekingalpha.com/instablog/605212-robert-allan-schwartz/4831186-annual-returns-s-and-p-500-1928-2015.
43	Any investor can sell such risks to others (essentially buy an insurance policy) by purchasing options. Most pension funds do so, but similar to insurance policies, there is a cost attached to such behavior. Of course, any investor also
can choose to buy these risks as well, and this could result either in gains or losses.
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internally manages 100% of its fixed income investments and 40% of its

fees. The VRS’s external management expenses were 0.52% of its total

public equity investments, but only 6% of its real asset investments. All

investments, above the national median of 0.34%. While the VRS’s

other assets are managed by external experts whom the VRS must pay for

external management expenses are higher than the national median, its

their services.

performance in this regard is significantly better than some other state

In 2016, the Pew Charitable Trusts reported that median state pension
plans expended $70.9 million on expenses to administer the pension
system, significantly less than the $390.9 million in expenses for the VRS.
However, this may be misleading, as Virginia has one system while other
states have several systems. Taking this potential critique into account,
we find that the VRS’s total investment expenses were 0.58% of its total

pension funds. The Arizona Public Safety Personnel Retirement System,
for example, had management fees equal to 2.23% of investment assets
in 2016. On the other hand, Utah, which invests 42% of its portfolio in
alternative investments (real estate, hedge funds, etc.), only paid external
management expenses equal to 0.13% of its total investments. These data
suggest that the VRS could lower its external management costs.

investments. These costs were primarily driven by external management
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■ Strategic

Opportunities

■

Cash

■

Other

However, we must take care to note that the Pew data conflict with the

this results in higher fee payments. Second, rising equity prices during this

VRS’s and JLARC’s assertions that the VRS’s investment expenses have

period may also have resulted in higher fee payments.

been lower than the national average. The VRS has also expressed serious
concern about Pew’s definitions and its findings. Reasonable people can
disagree on these points.

An irony attached to this circumstance is that for a decade or more, the
typical hedge or actively managed fund consistently has underperformed
public equity markets overall. Put differently, a typical investor could have

It is not clear precisely how the VRS compensates its external fund

invested in an equity index fund marketed by a well-established provider

managers. An industry standard, however, is “2 and 20,” which translates

such as Fidelity or Vanguard, then lapsed into a deep coma, and woken

to annual fees that are 2% of all managed assets plus 20% of any profits

up a decade later to find that he or she consistently had outperformed

generated after some minimum hurdle has been met. The New York

the actively managed funds. In a typical year, 60% to 80% of hedge and

Times labeled this a “Heads We Win, Tails You Lose” arrangement.44

actively managed funds do not perform as well as the S&P 500 average.

The VRS reported in July 2018 that it kept 80% of returns in excess of

In 2018, the average hedge fund lost 5.23%, while the S&P 500 fell only

an 8% annualized return, with the remaining 20% paid to the external

4.38%.

investment managers who generated the return. As of July 2018, these
arrangements resulted in the VRS keeping $21.9 billion in excess returns
and $3.8 billion being paid out to external managers “since inception.”45

Graph 7 reports similar annual information for the 2009-2018 period.
Note the 10-year losing streak of hedge funds versus the S&P 500 Index.
From 2002 to 2017, 92.33% of actively managed large cap funds failed

However, a consensus has emerged nationally that “reported fee data are

to outperform the S&P 500; 94.81% of actively managed mid cap funds

often unreliable and complete fee information is unknown even to the

failed to outperform the S&P MidCap 400 Index; and 95.73% of actively

pension fund.”46 Fee arrangements sometimes are amazingly Byzantine.47

managed small cap funds failed to outperform the S&P SmallCap 600

Thus, when a recent study of state pension funds by the American

Index.50 Fidelity, which on March 31, 2018, managed $2.09 trillion in

Federation of Teachers concluded that 12 large public employee pension

mutual fund assets,51 offers its FUSEX 500 Index Fund, which is designed

funds could have saved $3.8 billion annually by reducing their reliance

to replicate the equities in the S&P 500. FUSEX returned 9.42% annually

upon hedge and actively managed funds, one must treat such data as rough

over the past 10 years and its expense ratio was a miniscule .09%.52 This

approximations.

compares to the VRS’s 6.66% annual rate of return over the 2006-2015

There is no disagreement, however, that the VRS’s investment
management expenses have risen recently (JLARC says 48% between FY
13 and FY 17),48 presumably for two reasons. First, the VRS has been
investing greater proportions of its funds externally rather than in the
public equities and fixed income instruments it manages internally,49 and

period (but 4.9% for the 10 years ending Sept. 30, 2017) and investment
expenses of 0.55%. The VRS could have increased its rate of return by
2.76% and reduced its expenses by .46% had it indexed its investments
solely in public equities (not a strategy we would recommend for a variety
of reasons, but an interesting comparison nonetheless).

44 As reported by the American Federation of Teachers, “The Big Squeeze” (2017), www.aft.org/sites/default/files/bigsqueeze_may2017.pdf.
45 Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, VRS Oversight Report (July 2018). It is not clear from the report what time period or periods “since inception” comprises.
46 American Federation of Teachers. Pew agrees.
47 Gretchen Morgenson, “The Deal’s Done. But Not the Fees,” The New York Times (May 24, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/business/the-deals-done-but-not-the-fees.html.
48 Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, VRS Oversight Report (December 2017), p. 7, http://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/reports/Rpt504.pdf.
49 The supposition of the American Federation of Teachers.
50	Mark Perry, “More evidence that it’s very hard to ‘beat the market’ over time, 95% of finance professionals can’t do it,” AEI Ideas (March 20, 2018), http://www.aei.org/publication/more-evidence-that-its-very-hard-to-beat-themarket-over-time-95-of-financial-professionals-cant-do-it.
51 www.fidelity.com/about-fidelity/fidelity-by-numbers/corporate-statistics.
52 Fidelity 500 Index Fund, https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/composition/315911206 (accessed April 9, 2018).
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The lesson is that most public pension funds have the potential to

Ultimately, evidence should rule the day. Consider that a 10% reduction

reduce their expenses if they opt to use indexed public equity funds

in annual investment costs for the VRS would translate to savings of

rather than their own staff or external fund managers. We recognize

approximately $45 million annually. A 0.1% increase in the rate of return

moving in this direction is anathema to many at the VRS, but the

the VRS realizes on its public equity investments similarly would add

potential savings command attention.

about $40 million to its coffers. These are possibilities that should not be

There is an interesting analog to this discussion. University endowments

ignored.

bear some similarity to pension funds in terms of the return vs. risk

We do not argue that the VRS should index all its investments, or

dilemma, though they can more easily reduce payments to endowment

avoid all higher cost fund managers, though today it is possible

account holders than can pension funds. In recent years, university

to index nearly any significant asset – commodities, real estate,

foundations and endowments have engaged in many of the same

international assets and currencies in addition to equities and bonds.

investment strategies as pension funds. The results have been less than

We agree that index investments don’t always outperform actively

spectacular. Over the past decade, university endowments returned an

managed assets and some specific active investment strategies

average of 4.6% on their investments. This trailed the 5.3% rate of return

may exploit less well-known asset segments and possible market

that a simple 60/40 stock/bond index fund mix would have returned or

inefficiencies to outperform indexes. In addition, indexed investments

the 5.4% rate of return that a simple 70/30 stock/bond index fund mix

could be more volatile than some actively managed investments. Again,

would have returned.53 That is, they could have done better by “indexing”

the salient point is that a significant majority of actively managed

(investing in funds that imitate entire markets or segments of markets

funds fail to do as well as the market on a consistent basis. Hence, we

rather than investing in specific stocks or bonds, to minimize their trading

recommend that the VRS index a larger proportion of its public equity

and offer much lower management costs as one consequence).

portfolio and that it assess carefully the extent to which indexing might

Investment professionals who make their living from the fees they earn

be useful in other asset classes as well.

from actively investing funds on behalf of their clients often supply a

The VRS responded to this suggestion in a July 6, 2018, email: “Private

blizzard of reasons why their services are valuable, if not irreplaceable.

equity has been great for VRS. Indexing these funds would adversely

Some of their arguments do resonate. For example, whole market index

impact the plan.” We largely agree with this conclusion because data

funds such as those offered by Fidelity and Vanguard

54

do not contain

supplied by the VRS indicate that what it labels its “private equity”

assets or companies that are new on the scene, or are not publicly traded,

investments (as opposed to “public equity”) often have generated higher

and thus one could miss potentially superb opportunities if one only

rates of return and exhibited lower variability than VRS’s public equity

indexes the public firms via a fund such as the FUSEX 500.

investments. Sound principles of diversification make some private equity

Nevertheless, the arguments put forward by active investment
professionals can tend to be self-serving. They make their living by
convincing the VRS and other pension funds to hire them to manage their
portfolios. Each is a master at explaining why they and their approach to
investing are different – why they will succeed even while others rather
consistently fall short.

investments a good idea for the VRS. We would insert a caveat, however.
The VRS’s private equity investments may involve it investing in funds
that purchase public firms, take them private, then disgorge many of their
assets and ultimately lead them into bankruptcy. Some label this vulture
capitalism,55 and decry it, but in recent years it often has been a profitable
strategy.

53 A nontechnical rendition of this situation may be found at James B. Steward, “College Endowments Opt for Alternative, and Less Lucrative, Route,” The New York Times (Feb. 22, 2018).
54	The VRS commented to us via email that “VRS provides index funds for cheaper than Fidelity because we are doing so with internal staff.” However, these individuals and their activities are not gratis. They have opportunity costs
and hence the comparison with Fidelity and Vanguard is not apt.
55 “Vulture Capitalist,” Investopedia, www.investopedia.com/terms/vulturecapitalist.asp.
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Defined Benefit Versus
Defined Contribution
Pension Programs
Earlier, we sketched the differences between defined benefit, defined
contribution and hybrid public pension programs. Historically, most public
employee pension programs have been defined benefit rather than defined
contribution in nature.
Many public employees prefer defined benefit programs because such
programs guarantee them a specific income for the remainder of their
lives. Further, depending on the length of their service and their highest
earning years, defined benefit programs may produce very respectable
retirement incomes for them, especially if accompanied by cost-of-living
escalators that usually are not present in defined contribution programs.
Also, depending on how the funds in a defined contribution program
are invested, a recipient’s income from that program could increase or
decrease.
Taxpayers and citizens find the problem with defined benefit retirement
obligations is that they frequently become fiscally burdensome. Longer
life spans mean that government pension obligations extend well beyond
the time periods originally anticipated. Lower interest rates make it
more difficult for pension funds to earn respectable rates of return on
traditional low-risk assets such as U.S. government bonds. We have seen
this has pushed pension funds into adopting riskier investment mixes
involving more equities, commodities and real estate in an attempt to
generate higher rates of return.

that pension benefits promised to state employees could be rolled back by
the state. His changing stance on this matter reflected fiscal reality: in FY
2017, California spent double the amount on pensions as it spent in FY
2009.56 It is worth noting that from the standpoint of taxpayers, Virginia’s
plans are more modest than those of California.
The General Assembly has taken positive steps to extend the reach
of hybrid retirement programs. Since Jan. 1, 2014, most new state
employees, teachers and local employees enroll in a hybrid plan that
combines defined benefit and defined contribution features. On March
31, 2018, 24% of the total active VRS membership was participating in
a hybrid plan.57
A problem here is that 43% of hybrid plan participants do not make
contributions other than those required of them.58 This means that they
forfeit a generous matching contribution offered by the Commonwealth
and damage their long-term financial status.
The General Assembly can assist by continuing to mandate policy
“nudges.” The Commonwealth’s hybrid plan currently contains an autoescalation feature whereby every three years, participants’ voluntary
contributions are increased by 0.5% if they aren’t already contributing
the maximum 4%. Those who contribute the 4% match receive a 2.5%
contributory match from the Commonwealth. Thus, if they do not
choose to contribute 4%, then they are leaving money on the table and
diminishing their eventual retirement stipend. If VRS participants who
are not contributing the 4% maximum use the internet to log into their
VRS accounts, then they are politely informed that they are not serving
themselves well and immediately provided with opportunities to increase
their contributions so that they can capture the Commonwealth’s matching
funds.

Pension contributions account for increasing proportions of the budgets
of state and local government units. States such as Illinois face disastrous
fiscal situations, substantially because of their burgeoning public employee
pension obligations. California’s Gov. Jerry Brown gained attention in
early 2018 when he expressed his hope that California courts would rule
56 Romy Varghese, “California’s Brown Raises Prospect of Pension Cuts in Downturn,” Bloomberg (Jan. 10, 2018), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-10/california-s-brown-raises-prospect-of-pension-cuts-in-downturn.
57 Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, VRS Oversight Report (July 2018).
58 Virginia Retirement System, Popular Annual Financial Report as of June 30, 2018.
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The Commonwealth might, however, require more generous contributions
from new participants at the start, but permit them to revoke this
guidance after several years.59 Experience in other states suggests that
large proportions of individuals who are so nudged become accustomed
to the higher level of contributions and continue them even when they no
longer are required to do so. In the long term, nudges stimulate what most
authorities regard as optimal economic choices for participants, though
they are not choices most participants initially make if they have the
freedom to do otherwise.
The Commonwealth’s long-term goal should be to move additional
classes of employees entirely into defined contribution programs
similar to those now available to faculty and to have all other
employees enrolled in the hybrid plan. It should walk this path because
this constitutes an important step toward guaranteeing that Virginia will
avoid the public employee pension problems that have afflicted so many
other states.60
The experience of the federal government in this regard is instructive.
Fiscal stress in the 1980s pushed the U.S. government in the direction
of enrolling all new federal workers in Social Security if they were not
already participants, diminishing the generosity of its existing defined
benefit program, and creating a defined contribution program with
matching employer/employee contributions. The now mandatory program
has proved to be popular with federal employees and has controlled the
expansion of the government’s future financial obligations (Gale et al. for
Brookings, 2016).

Portability
The lack of portability of state pension funds is an area where the
Commonwealth does not treat state employees as well as it should.
Excepting those state employees who opt to participate in an alternative
pension system such as TIAA-CREF, vested61 state employees who wish
to “cash out” their Virginia retirement account (perhaps because they
are moving to a job outside of state government) may receive back their
contributions to the VRS plus interest, but not those contributions made
by the Commonwealth. This assumes the departing employee has not
become separated because of job performance or misconduct.
The alternative is for employees to leave their contributions with the
VRS and to have their ultimate pension payment be based upon their
current salary, which typically does not turn out to be an attractive choice.
VRS credits only 4% of interest to withdrawn employee contributions,
even though it assumes it is earning substantially higher rates of return.
One well-positioned observer of this arrangement told us, “In a world
of increasing labor mobility, such a system is disgraceful.” We agree.
The Commonwealth should: (1) allow vested employees who leave state
employment to retain the Commonwealth’s contributions; and (2) credit
those contributions with a rate of return other than 4%, for example, a
rate closer to the VRS’s long-term rate of return on its investments. If the
VRS earns the 7% rate of return it currently assumes, then it still will
have earned a surplus on this account that it is not returning to departing
employees.

59 See Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Welfare and Happiness (New Haven: Yale, 2008).
60	Initially, this policy might be more expensive to Virginia than either the current hybrid program or a defined benefit program. If in the long term, however, it reduces the Commonwealth’s financial liabilities and eliminates the
possibility that Virginia in the future might imitate states such as Illinois and Connecticut, then it will have been worthwhile. Numerous states have asserted that “it can’t happen here,” only to find that changing economic and
political conditions have rendered their predictions null. Pew has reported that the public employee pension plans of the 50 states were underfunded by $1.4 billion in 2016. Pew Memorial Trusts, “The State Pension Funding Gap:
2016,” www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2018/04/the-state-pension-funding-gap-2016.
61 Employees “vest” after five years of service credit.
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Summarizing Proposals
For Change

Second, the Commonwealth should accelerate the movement of state

We applaud the VRS for being a transparent, generally well-managed

that participants make to their personal hybrid programs. Additional

operation. Its quality stewardship has enabled Virginia to avoid the

statutory “nudges” should be considered. Enhanced participation would

unfortunate pension experiences of many other states. Ronald E.

benefit VRS members and simultaneously reduce the Commonwealth’s

Schmitz, VRS’s chief investment officer, reported recently that “the

future financial risks and exposure. With respect to this latter point, the

VRS investment staff continues to generate good performance” and in

VRS estimates that the hybrid retirement program would reduce risk to

general, we agree.

employers within the defined benefit program by about one-third.62

Our measured judgment is that the VRS is an intelligently managed

Third, gradually, perhaps over a period as long as 20 years, the VRS

employees from defined benefit programs into defined contribution
and hybrid retirement programs. However, while doing so, the VRS
needs to find more effective ways to increase the voluntary contributions

operation that has avoided most of the problems that have afflicted

should reduce its target rate of return (rate of discount). This would

public employee pension systems in other states. An even-handed view

result in larger estimates of the future pension fund financial obligations

of the VRS leads to the conclusion that it deserves higher than average

of the VRS but would be consistent with the way private firms are

scores for its performance. However, careful, nonpolitical direction and

required to assess their portfolios and estimate their future financial

the changes we outline here are needed to guide Virginia’s pension funds

obligations. Because this action would necessitate some combination

through the challenges of coming decades. With this in mind, we believe

of larger state and local government pension contributions, larger

the General Assembly and the VRS should implement the following four

employee contributions or diminished benefits, it would require extensive

changes in public employee pensions.

conversations with the General Assembly.

First, the VRS should index larger proportions of its asset portfolio

Fourth, the Commonwealth should improve the portability of the state

and especially do so inside its domestic public equity portfolio, where

employees’ VRS accounts. As things stand, vested employees who depart

approximately one-third of all its assets reside. The evidence in

state employment receive only their own contributions (not those of the

this area speaks loudly – indexed public equity funds consistently have

Commonwealth) plus a 4% rate of interest on their contributions. The

outperformed most actively managed public equity funds; this has been

alternative for these individuals is to leave their contributions with the

true for the last 15 years. Further, if we lengthen our time horizon to 25

VRS, which means that ultimately, they would receive pension payments

years, Vanguard’s low-cost VTSMX indexed fund reflecting the entire

based on what their salary was when they departed. Ordinarily, this is not

U.S. stock market has generated a higher rate of return than the VRS has

an attractive choice. The Commonwealth can and should do better in an

within its own public equity sphere and has achieved this with essentially

era characterized by high levels of employee mobility.

the same Sharpe Ratio. We understand that managers of hedge funds
and active investors persistently contend that they are exceptions to
accumulated empirical evidence and therefore have the ability to produce
both above-average returns and below-average volatility. Even though this
might prove true for a certain period, it is unlikely to persist, and hence,
following such advice is a bet Virginia would be wise to decline.

Should the Commonwealth not move in these directions, then the
probability increases that it will experience future public pension
problems. By no means do we see disaster looming on the horizon;
however, very few analysts foresaw the financial implosion of 2008-2009.
Considered in this light, our recommendations represent fiscally prudent
courses of action.

62 Joint Legislative Audit and Review Committee, VRS Overview Report (July 9, 2018), at p. 48, http://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/oversight/VRS/2018_VRS-Pres.pdf.
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